Oligopolistic price competition with informed and uninformed buyers

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F10%3A00351492" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/10:00351492 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Oligopolistic price competition with informed and uninformed buyers

Original language description

The standard price competition of two or more players leads to Bertrand equilibrium in basic economic theory. I follow the literature that originated with Varian?s (1980) model, especially Kocas and Kiyak (2006), and analyze oligopolistic markets where buyers have reservation values drawn from a common distribution function rather than a single value (inelastic demand), as typically assumed in the models of Varian?s or Kocas and Kiyak?s type. The model presented in this paper is developed from the simplest symmetric set-up (uninformed buyers are assigned to sellers evenly) to the most complex asymmetric set-up with many competing sellers (uninformed buyers are distributed over sellers unevenly).

Czech name

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Czech description

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Type

J_x - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)

CEP classification

AH - Economics

OECD FORD branch

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Project

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Continuities

Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)

Publication year

2010

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

CERGE-EI Working Paper Series

ISSN

1211-3298

e-ISSN

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Volume of the periodical

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Issue of the periodical within the volume

413

Country of publishing house

CZ - CZECH REPUBLIC

Number of pages

34

Pages from-to

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UT code for WoS article

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EID of the result in the Scopus database

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