Information unraveling revisited: disclosure of horizontal attributes

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F14%3A00439519" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/14:00439519 - isvavai.cz</a>
Alternative codes found
RIV/67985998:_____/14:00427966
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joie.12043" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joie.12043</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joie.12043" target="_blank" >10.1111/joie.12043</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Information unraveling revisited: disclosure of horizontal attributes
Original language description
This paper analyzes in a spatial framework how much information a seller discloses about the variety he sells when he faces a buyer with a privately known taste for variety. I identify an equilibrium in which, for each possible variety, the seller?s optimal strategy consists of either fully disclosing the variety or disclosing how far it is from the buyer?s expected taste. The set of varieties the seller fully discloses monotonically expands as the buyer?s taste for variety becomes stronger. I show thatthis is the unique undefeated equilibrium. From a policy perspective, mandating full disclosure is socially harmful.
Czech name
—
Czech description
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Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AH - Economics
OECD FORD branch
—

Project
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Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2014
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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