Clientelism and development: vote-buying meets patronage
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F22%3A00556762" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/22:00556762 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298211061515" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298211061515</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/09516298211061515" target="_blank" >10.1177/09516298211061515</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Clientelism and development: vote-buying meets patronage
Original language description
Offering employment in the public sector in exchange for electoral support (patronage politics) and vote-buying are clientelistic practices frequently used by political machines. In the literature, these practices are typically studied in isolation. In this paper, we study how the interaction between these two practices (as opposed to having just one tool) affects economic development. We present a theoretical model of political competition, where, before the election, the incumbent chooses the level of state investment that can improve productivity in the private sector. This decision affects the income levels of employees in the private sector, and, thereby, the costs and effectiveness of vote-buying and patronage. We show that when the politician can use both clientelistic instruments simultaneously, his opportunity cost for clientelism in terms of foregone future taxes declines. As a result, the equilibrium amount of public investment is typically lower when both tools are available than otherwise.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics
Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Others
Publication year
2022
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Journal of Theoretical Politics
ISSN
0951-6298
e-ISSN
1460-3667
Volume of the periodical
34
Issue of the periodical within the volume
1
Country of publishing house
GB - UNITED KINGDOM
Number of pages
32
Pages from-to
3-34
UT code for WoS article
000736355700001
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85121834091