An equivalence between rational inattention problems and complete-information conformity games

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F22%3A00556928" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/22:00556928 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110444" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110444</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110444" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110444</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
An equivalence between rational inattention problems and complete-information conformity games
Original language description
We consider two types of models: (i) a rational inattention problem (as known from the literature) and (ii) a conformity game, in which fully informed players find it costly to deviate from average behavior. We show that these problems are equivalent to each other both from the perspective of the participant and the outside observer: Each individual faces identical trade-offs in both situations, and an observer would not be able to distinguish the two models from the choice data they generate. We also establish when individual behavior in the conformity game maximizes welfare.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Project
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Continuities
S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach<br>I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2022
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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