An equivalence between rational inattention problems and complete-information conformity games
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F22%3A00557331" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/22:00557331 - isvavai.cz</a>
Alternative codes found
RIV/00216208:11640/22:00557332
Result on the web
<a href="https://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp719.pdf" target="_blank" >https://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp719.pdf</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
An equivalence between rational inattention problems and complete-information conformity games
Original language description
We consider two types of models: (i) a rational inattention problem (as known from the literature) and (ii) a conformity game, in which fully informed players find it costly to deviate from average behavior. We show that these problems are equivalent to each other both from the perspective of the participant and the outside observer: Each individual faces identical trade-offs in both situations, and an observer would not be able to distinguish the two models from the choice data they generate. We also establish when individual behavior in the conformity game maximizes welfare.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
O - Miscellaneous
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics
Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Others
Publication year
2022
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů