How to Reconstruct a Thought Experiment

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14210%2F11%3A00049785" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14210/11:00049785 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
—
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
—

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
How to Reconstruct a Thought Experiment
Original language description
The paper is a contribution to the debate on the epistemological status of thought experiments. I deal with the epistemological uniqueness of experiments in the sense of their irreducibility to other sources of justification. In particular, I criticize an influential argument for the irreducibility of thought experiments to general arguments. First, I introduce the radical empiricist theory of eliminativism, which considers thought experiments to be rhetorically modified arguments, uninteresting from the epistemological point of view. Second, I present objections to the theory, focusing on the critique of eliminativism by Tamar Szabó Gendler based on the reconstruction of famous Galileo's Pisa experiment. I show that her reconstruction is simplistic and that more elaborate reconstruction is needed for an appropriate assessment of the epistemic power of general argument. I propose such a reconstruction and demonstrate that general version of Pisa experiment is epistemically equal to the
Czech name
—
Czech description
—

Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AA - Philosophy and religion
OECD FORD branch
—

Project
<a href="/en/project/GA401%2F09%2F0661" target="_blank" >GA401/09/0661: Thought Experiments in Philosophy</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Publication year
2011
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Similar results(10)