Reverberating the Glas: Towards a Deconstructive Account of Particularity in Hegel’s Logic of the Concept
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14210%2F22%3A00118757" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14210/22:00118757 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2020.24" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2020.24</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2020.24" target="_blank" >10.1017/hgl.2020.24</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Reverberating the Glas: Towards a Deconstructive Account of Particularity in Hegel’s Logic of the Concept
Original language description
Understanding Hegel’s account of particularity has proven to be anything but straightforward. Two main accounts of particularity have been advanced: the particular as an example or instance and the particular as a subjective perspective on a universal concept. The problem with these accounts is that they reduce particularity either to singularity or to universality. As Derrida’s analyses make apparent, the ‘structure of exemplarity’ in Hegel is quite intricate. Hegel uses ‘example’ in three senses: it means (1) ‘instance’, ‘illustration’, or (2) ‘model’, ‘exemplary individual’, ‘paradigm’, or (3) a by-play (a meaning derived from Hegel’s neologism beiherspielen, in which Beispiel is understood quasi-etymologically as a ‘by-play’ of accidental moments). A Beispiel in the first sense can be replaced by another instance in a free play (by-play). This play of accidental moments, however, is not entirely free; it generates a series (of replacements) that ultimately leads to an example in the second sense, to an exemplary individual. I argue that particularity can be taken as exemplarity of this kind, oscillating between a singular example and a universal paradigm. Within this by-play, the universal concept, its law, is supposed to be mediated and determined. However, out of the differences between the examples the by-play induces another law, the law of non-mediation, which may, in Derrida’s view, actually negate the dialectical movement towards universality. I argue, utilizing Malabou’s concept of plasticity, that this disruption may be recovered. This implies that each individual example within a series is a particular determination of the universal. Hence, we can take literally Hegel’s claim that the movement of the concept is play.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>SC</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the SCOPUS database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GA19-16680S" target="_blank" >GA19-16680S: Paradigmatic thinking: singularity, universality, self-reference</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2022
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Hegel Bulletin
ISSN
2051-5367
e-ISSN
2051-5375
Volume of the periodical
43
Issue of the periodical within the volume
19
Country of publishing house
GB - UNITED KINGDOM
Number of pages
28
Pages from-to
93-120
UT code for WoS article
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EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85130224074