The Case for Judicial Councils as Fourth-Branch Institutions
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14220%2F24%3A00135734" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14220/24:00135734 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-constitutional-law-review/article/case-for-judicial-councils-as-fourthbranch-institutions/9C1A6DBEC87D90D64546EB133BFF6F73" target="_blank" >https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-constitutional-law-review/article/case-for-judicial-councils-as-fourthbranch-institutions/9C1A6DBEC87D90D64546EB133BFF6F73</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1574019624000038" target="_blank" >10.1017/S1574019624000038</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
The Case for Judicial Councils as Fourth-Branch Institutions
Original language description
Many European countries have transferred powers concerning judicial careers and court administration to judicial councils. These independent bodies were intended to depoliticise the judiciary, maintain a balance between judicial independence and accountability, and ideally increase the quality and efficiency of the judicial branch. Supranational organisations, judges, policymakers, lawyers and political scientists argue vehemently whether judicial councils delivered the goods they promised. Constitutional theorists lag behind. They either skipped the debate on where to place judicial councils within the separation of powers, assuming that they belonged to the judicial branch, or lament that judicial councils violate the classical tripartite separation of powers without addressing new advancement in the separation of powers scholarship. This article aims to fill this gap and theorises about the place and role of judicial councils in the separation of powers. It argues that all judicial councils gravitate towards one of four ideal types – judge-controlled, politician-controlled, inter-branch and fourth-branch – each placing the judicial council in a different position vis-à-vis the three classical branches. Based on the experience with judicial councils so far, we argue that conceptualising judicial councils as fourth-branch institutions provides the best protection against the two greatest dangers judicial councils face – corporativism and politicisation.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50501 - Law
Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
R - Projekt Ramcoveho programu EK
Others
Publication year
2024
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
European constitutional law review
ISSN
1574-0196
e-ISSN
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Volume of the periodical
20
Issue of the periodical within the volume
1
Country of publishing house
GB - UNITED KINGDOM
Number of pages
38
Pages from-to
82-119
UT code for WoS article
001174005900001
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85186866550