Farmers’ Adoption of Irrigation Technologies : Experimental Evidence from a Coordination Game with Positive Network Externalities in India
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14230%2F18%3A00101962" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14230/18:00101962 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/geer.12117" target="_blank" >https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/geer.12117</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/geer.12117" target="_blank" >10.1111/geer.12117</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Farmers’ Adoption of Irrigation Technologies : Experimental Evidence from a Coordination Game with Positive Network Externalities in India
Original language description
Electric irrigation contributes to food security in rural India, but deteriorating electrical infrastructures threaten the functioning of farmers’ pump sets. This problem could be solved through investments in energy-efficient technologies. However, network externalities create a coordination problem for farmers. We develop a framed field experiment to study the effects of group size, leading by example, and payoff structures on the ability to coordinate technology adoption investments. The experiment is based on a game that combines features of a step-level public goods game and a critical mass game. Our findings show that smaller groups more frequently coordinate on payoff-superior equilibria and that higher payoffs lead to more investments. Contrary to previous studies, leading by example reduces investments but has no effect on efficiency. Building on this analysis, we discuss possible bottom-up solutions to the energy crisis in rural India.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50200 - Economics and Business
Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
V - Vyzkumna aktivita podporovana z jinych verejnych zdroju
Others
Publication year
2018
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
German Economic Review
ISSN
1465-6485
e-ISSN
1468-0475
Volume of the periodical
19
Issue of the periodical within the volume
2
Country of publishing house
US - UNITED STATES
Number of pages
21
Pages from-to
119-139
UT code for WoS article
000429543200001
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85003758799