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Punishing the weakest link - voluntary sanctions and efficient coordination in the minimum effort game

The result's identifiers

  • Result code in IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F23%3A00576265" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/23:00576265 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Alternative codes found

    RIV/00216208:11640/23:00582621

  • Result on the web

    <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09931-1" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09931-1</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09931-1" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11238-023-09931-1</a>

Alternative languages

  • Result language

    angličtina

  • Original language name

    Punishing the weakest link - voluntary sanctions and efficient coordination in the minimum effort game

  • Original language description

    Using a laboratory experiment, we examine whether voluntary sanctions induce subjects to coordinate more efficiently in a repeated minimum-effort game. While most groups first experience Pareto inferior coordination in a baseline treatment, the level of effort increases substantially once ex post sanctioning opportunities are introduced, that is, when one can assign costly punishment points to other group members to reduce their payoffs. We compare the effect of this voluntary punishment possibility with the effect of ex post costless communication, which in contrast to the punishment treatment increases efforts only temporarily and fails to bring the players to higher payoff equilibria permanently. Our results indicate that decentralized sanctions can play an important role as a coordination device in Pareto-ranked coordination settings. They also suggest that the motivations behind voluntary sanctions may be more general than usually put forth in the literature on cooperation games.

  • Czech name

  • Czech description

Classification

  • Type

    J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

  • CEP classification

  • OECD FORD branch

    50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Result continuities

  • Project

    <a href="/en/project/GBP402%2F12%2FG130" target="_blank" >GBP402/12/G130: The relationships between skills, schooling and labor market outcomes: A longitudinal study</a><br>

  • Continuities

    I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Others

  • Publication year

    2023

  • Confidentiality

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Data specific for result type

  • Name of the periodical

    Theory and Decision

  • ISSN

    0040-5833

  • e-ISSN

    1573-7187

  • Volume of the periodical

    95

  • Issue of the periodical within the volume

    3

  • Country of publishing house

    NL - THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

  • Number of pages

    28

  • Pages from-to

    429-456

  • UT code for WoS article

    001005058700001

  • EID of the result in the Scopus database

    2-s2.0-85161309871