Maximum effort in the minimum-effort game

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F10%3A00348753" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/10:00348753 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Maximum effort in the minimum-effort game

Original language description

We report results from standard minimum-effort experiments conducted in Copenhagen (Denmark). Our subjects frequently coordinate on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium even in groups of six. This is in stark contrast to the previous literature, as we show in a detailed analysis of experiments which had the same design but were held in different countries. The subject-pool effect is substantiated by the finding that, the higher the share of Danish subjects in a group, the higher the minimum-effort levels. These findings suggest that the prevalent coordination failures previously observed are affected by significant subject-pool effects.

Czech name

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Czech description

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Type

J_x - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)

CEP classification

AH - Economics

OECD FORD branch

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Project

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Continuities

Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)

Publication year

2010

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

Experimental Economics

ISSN

1386-4157

e-ISSN

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Volume of the periodical

13

Issue of the periodical within the volume

3

Country of publishing house

NL - THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

Number of pages

11

Pages from-to

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UT code for WoS article

000280555100001

EID of the result in the Scopus database

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