Ideal Consensus, Real Diversity, and the Challenge of Public Justification : On the Limits of Idealisation in Liberal Political Theory

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14230%2F21%3A00118933" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14230/21:00118933 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

<a href="https://acpo.vedeckecasopisy.cz/publicFiles/002280.pdf" target="_blank" >https://acpo.vedeckecasopisy.cz/publicFiles/002280.pdf</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.14712/1803-8220/14_2020" target="_blank" >10.14712/1803-8220/14_2020</a>

Result language

čeština

Original language name

Ideální konsenzus, reálná diverzita a výzva veřejného ospravedlnění : k limitům idealizace v liberální politické teorii

Original language description

The paper deals with the methodological clash between idealism and anti-idealism in political philosophy, and highlights its importance for public reason (PR) and public justification (PJ) theorising. Upon reviewing the broader context which harks back to Rawls’s notion of a realistic utopia, we focus on two major recent contributions to the debate in the work of David Estlund (the prototypical utopian) and Gerald Gaus (the cautious anti-utopian). While Estlund presents a powerful case on behalf of ideal theorising, claiming that motivational incapacity and other non-ideal features of “human nature” – the so-called bad facts – do not normally refute the desirability of highly utopian theories of justice, we show that Gaus is correct in stressing the importance of feasibility considerations, including empirical knowledge about human societies. Because moral disagreement is to be expected even among cognitively and morally excellent reasoners, we argue that Estlund’s search for Truth about justice must idealise away normative diversity as just another bad fact. This methodological dispute has important ramifications for current debates about PR and PJ as the grounds of liberal legitimacy. Because consensual approaches rely on strong idealisation which results in exclusion of numerous comprehensive doctrines from consideration, we conclude that convergence-based liberal political theory has distinct advantage as regards exploiting normative diversity to the advantage of everyone

Czech name

Ideální konsenzus, reálná diverzita a výzva veřejného ospravedlnění : k limitům idealizace v liberální politické teorii

Czech description

The paper deals with the methodological clash between idealism and anti-idealism in political philosophy, and highlights its importance for public reason (PR) and public justification (PJ) theorising. Upon reviewing the broader context which harks back to Rawls’s notion of a realistic utopia, we focus on two major recent contributions to the debate in the work of David Estlund (the prototypical utopian) and Gerald Gaus (the cautious anti-utopian). While Estlund presents a powerful case on behalf of ideal theorising, claiming that motivational incapacity and other non-ideal features of “human nature” – the so-called bad facts – do not normally refute the desirability of highly utopian theories of justice, we show that Gaus is correct in stressing the importance of feasibility considerations, including empirical knowledge about human societies. Because moral disagreement is to be expected even among cognitively and morally excellent reasoners, we argue that Estlund’s search for Truth about justice must idealise away normative diversity as just another bad fact. This methodological dispute has important ramifications for current debates about PR and PJ as the grounds of liberal legitimacy. Because consensual approaches rely on strong idealisation which results in exclusion of numerous comprehensive doctrines from consideration, we conclude that convergence-based liberal political theory has distinct advantage as regards exploiting normative diversity to the advantage of everyone

Type

J_SC - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the SCOPUS database

CEP classification

—

OECD FORD branch

50601 - Political science

Project

<a href="/en/project/GA19-11091S" target="_blank" >GA19-11091S: Beyond Public Reason? Critiques and Defences of the Liberal Agenda of Public Justification</a><br>

Continuities

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Publication year

2021

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

Acta Politologica

ISSN

1803-8220

e-ISSN

1804-1302

Volume of the periodical

13

Issue of the periodical within the volume

2

Country of publishing house

CZ - CZECH REPUBLIC

Number of pages

22

Pages from-to

49-70

UT code for WoS article

—

EID of the result in the Scopus database

2-s2.0-85105852512