TPMScan: A wide-scale study of security-relevant properties of TPM 2.0 chips

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14330%2F24%3A00135511" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14330/24:00135511 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2024.i2.714-734" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2024.i2.714-734</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2024.i2.714-734" target="_blank" >10.46586/tches.v2024.i2.714-734</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

TPMScan: A wide-scale study of security-relevant properties of TPM 2.0 chips

Original language description

The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a widely deployed computer component that provides increased protection of key material during cryptographic operations, secure storage, and support for a secure boot with a remotely attestable state of the target machine. A systematic study of the TPM ecosystem, its cryptographic properties, and the orderliness of vulnerability mitigation is missing despite its pervasive deployment -- likely due to the black-box nature of the implementations. We collected metadata, RSA and ECC cryptographic keys, and performance characteristics from numfws{} different TPM versions manufactured by numvendors{} vendors, including recent Pluton-based iTPMs, to systematically analyze TPM implementations. Surprisingly, a high rate of changes with a detectable impact on generated secrets, the timing of cryptographic operations, and frequent off-chip generation of Endorsement Keys were observed. Our analysis of public artifacts for TPM-related products certified under Common Criteria (CC) and FIPS 140 showed relatively high popularity of TPMs but without explanation for these changes in cryptographic implementations. Despite TPMs being commonly certified to CC EAL4+, serious vulnerabilities like ROCA or TPM-Fail were discovered in the past. We found a range of additional unreported nonce leakages in ECDSA, ECSCHNORR, and ECDAA algorithms in dTPMs and fTPMs of three vendors. The most serious discovered leakage allows extraction of the private key of certain Intel's fTPM versions using only nine signatures with no need for any side-channel information, making the vulnerability retrospectively exploitable despite a subsequent firmware update. Unreported timing leakages were discovered in the implementations of ECC algorithms on multiple Nuvoton TPMs, and other previously reported leakages were confirmed. The analysis also unveiled incompleteness of vulnerability reporting and subsequent mitigation with missing clear information about the affected versions and inconsistent fixes.

Czech name

—

Czech description

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Type

D - Article in proceedings

CEP classification

—

OECD FORD branch

10200 - Computer and information sciences

Project

<a href="/en/project/VJ02010010" target="_blank" >VJ02010010: Tools for AI-enhanced Security Verification of Cryptographic Devices</a><br>

Continuities

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Publication year

2024

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Article name in the collection

IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems

ISBN

—

ISSN

2569-2925

e-ISSN

—

Number of pages

21

Pages from-to

714-734

Publisher name

Ruhr-University of Bochum

Place of publication

Bochum

Event location

Bochum

Event date

Jan 1, 2024

Type of event by nationality

WRD - Celosvětová akce

UT code for WoS article

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