Elicitation of normative and fairness judgments: Do incentives matter?
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F15%3A00083143" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/15:00083143 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Elicitation of normative and fairness judgments: Do incentives matter?
Original language description
Krupka and Weber (2013) introduce an incentive-compatible coordination game as an alternative method for elicitation of normative judgments. I show, however, that people provide virtually the same responses in incentivized and nonincentivized versions ofthe Krupka-Weber game. Besides ratings of social appropriateness, I also elicit ratings of fairness of all possible offers in an ultimatum game. Ratings of social appropriateness and fairness are similar for low offers (below or equal to the equal split), but not for high offers which are judged to be more appropriate than fair.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AN - Psychology
OECD FORD branch
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Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach
Others
Publication year
2015
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Judgment and Decision Making
ISSN
1930-2975
e-ISSN
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Volume of the periodical
10
Issue of the periodical within the volume
2
Country of publishing house
US - UNITED STATES
Number of pages
7
Pages from-to
191-197
UT code for WoS article
000351862400006
EID of the result in the Scopus database
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