Experimental study of bribery in public procurement
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F15%3A00084370" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/15:00084370 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Experimental study of bribery in public procurement
Original language description
Corruption negatively effects economic and market development (Fisman & Svensson 2007), batters social stability and moral foundations (Jong-sung & Khagram 2005) or causes inefficiency in public expenditures and public sector itself (Blackburn etal. 2005). The significant part of public expenditures is usually spent through public procurement. Bribery in public procurement is illegal interaction be- tween a public official responsible for the tender and a competing firm. Reciprocity might be one of potential driving factors of the decisions made by the official in such situation. How will the official react to a bribe? Will his/her decision - who wins the procurement - not be affected by the bribe? Will he/she opportunistically take it but notreturn the favor? Or will he/she blow the whistle and report the briber to authorities? We bring the bribery in public procurement to laboratory and study it experimentally.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
O - Miscellaneous
CEP classification
AH - Economics
OECD FORD branch
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Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach
Others
Publication year
2015
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů