Corrupt reciprocity in public procurement: an experimental study

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F14%3A00077637" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/14:00077637 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Corrupt reciprocity in public procurement: an experimental study
Original language description
In the experiment I focus on reciprocal actions of the public official as a response to an offered bribe. When a briber gives the bribe he expects to privately benefit in return. In such situation a certain degree of trust between the briber and the official is required. He/she anticipates a positive reciprocal action from the public official and, since corruption is illegal in most of the countries, he/she also anticipates mutual trust. The experiment is based on existing literature and combines bribery experiment designs by Abbink, Irlenbusch et al. (2002) and Lambsdorff and Frank (2011). I have created a 4-player game with three players acting as bribers (firms) and one as public official. Firms compete with randomly drawn projects with predetermined attributes (same quality, different costs) in public tender. They also get information if the project might be the winning one or not. The decision is weather to offer or not a payment. They label it as a bribe or a gift to public offic
Czech name
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Czech description
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Publication year
2014
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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