Coordinated selection of collective action: Wealthy-interest bias and inequality
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F24%3A00139485" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/24:00139485 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272724001087" target="_blank" >https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272724001087</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105172" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105172</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Coordinated selection of collective action: Wealthy-interest bias and inequality
Original language description
We extend a collective action problem to study policy and project selection by heterogeneous groups who prefer to work together on a joint initiative but may disagree on which initiative is best. Our framework, adapted from a model of multiple threshold public goods, presents groups with several mutually exclusive projects, any of which require sufficient support from the group to succeed. Individuals strictly prefer to contribute where and how much they believe others expect of them to ensure joint project success. Groups tend to coordinate on the public good preferred by the wealthiest member, demonstrating a wealthy-interest bias even without corruption, politics, and information asymmetries. At the same time, groups divide costs in highly progressive ways, with the wealthy voluntarily funding a disproportionate share, helping offset the inherent inequality from endowment and selection differences. We discuss applications for policy selection, charitable giving, and taxes.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GA20-06785S" target="_blank" >GA20-06785S: Experimental analysis of multiple public goods funding dilemmas</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2024
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN
0047-2727
e-ISSN
0047-2727
Volume of the periodical
238
Issue of the periodical within the volume
October
Country of publishing house
NL - THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS
Number of pages
21
Pages from-to
1-21
UT code for WoS article
001276381800001
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85199000563