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Coordinated selection of collective action: Wealthy-interest bias and inequality

The result's identifiers

  • Result code in IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F24%3A00139485" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/24:00139485 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Result on the web

    <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272724001087" target="_blank" >https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272724001087</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105172" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105172</a>

Alternative languages

  • Result language

    angličtina

  • Original language name

    Coordinated selection of collective action: Wealthy-interest bias and inequality

  • Original language description

    We extend a collective action problem to study policy and project selection by heterogeneous groups who prefer to work together on a joint initiative but may disagree on which initiative is best. Our framework, adapted from a model of multiple threshold public goods, presents groups with several mutually exclusive projects, any of which require sufficient support from the group to succeed. Individuals strictly prefer to contribute where and how much they believe others expect of them to ensure joint project success. Groups tend to coordinate on the public good preferred by the wealthiest member, demonstrating a wealthy-interest bias even without corruption, politics, and information asymmetries. At the same time, groups divide costs in highly progressive ways, with the wealthy voluntarily funding a disproportionate share, helping offset the inherent inequality from endowment and selection differences. We discuss applications for policy selection, charitable giving, and taxes.

  • Czech name

  • Czech description

Classification

  • Type

    J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

  • CEP classification

  • OECD FORD branch

    50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Result continuities

  • Project

    <a href="/en/project/GA20-06785S" target="_blank" >GA20-06785S: Experimental analysis of multiple public goods funding dilemmas</a><br>

  • Continuities

    P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Others

  • Publication year

    2024

  • Confidentiality

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Data specific for result type

  • Name of the periodical

    JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS

  • ISSN

    0047-2727

  • e-ISSN

    0047-2727

  • Volume of the periodical

    238

  • Issue of the periodical within the volume

    October

  • Country of publishing house

    NL - THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

  • Number of pages

    21

  • Pages from-to

    1-21

  • UT code for WoS article

    001276381800001

  • EID of the result in the Scopus database

    2-s2.0-85199000563