Corruption and Economic Theory
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216275%3A25410%2F18%3A39913284" target="_blank" >RIV/00216275:25410/18:39913284 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Corruption and Economic Theory
Original language description
Corruption is a phenomenon with many facets, which is usually interpreted from the viewpoints of a number of alternative approaches. This paper analyzes the problem of corruption from the perspective of economic theory as a science of general principles concerning the operation of society’s economic life. Does economics have something to say about the problem of corruption? It its methodological approach relevant for analyzing corruption? We think that it is. Even though theoretical economics has not made the problem of corruption subject to its attention, analyzing its historical evolution makes it possible to corroborate many economists’ interest in corruption’s negative impact on the economy as well as the possibility of understanding the problem of corruption within the methodological terrain of alternative economic trends. This paper emphasizes the significance of the theory of rational choice for investigating the motives of corrupt choices in addition to defining corruption in the context of this theory. By applying the Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function, the paper confirms that the duration and severity of punishment does not represent that great a risk for agents of corruption – in particular, this concerns individuals without aversion to risk. However, participants in corruption react to a change in the probability of discovery by limiting their activities in a relatively significant way, which makes it possible to increase the number of revealed and convicted perpetrators and, at the same time, lower the number of potential corrupt exchanges. In game theory, the final solution for the dilemma of corrupt choices shows that corrupt participants in economic relationships are able to crowd out honest agents. However, in the case of repeated games, it pays for the entities to play ethically.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
D - Article in proceedings
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50201 - Economic Theory
Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach
Others
Publication year
2018
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Article name in the collection
SGEM 2018 : conference proceedings. Vol. 5
ISBN
978-619-7408-67-6
ISSN
2367-5659
e-ISSN
neuvedeno
Number of pages
8
Pages from-to
"549 "- 556
Publisher name
SGEM
Place of publication
Sofia
Event location
Albena
Event date
Aug 24, 2018
Type of event by nationality
WRD - Celosvětová akce
UT code for WoS article
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