What is the Contribution of the Theory of Redistribution Systems to the Theory of Corruption?
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62156489%3A43110%2F12%3A00188806" target="_blank" >RIV/62156489:43110/12:00188806 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
What is the Contribution of the Theory of Redistribution Systems to the Theory of Corruption?
Original language description
Scholars making economic policy recommendations to resolve corruption problem use several approaches, the most dominant of which are the principal-agent and rent-seeking theories. In this paper, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems accounting for the environment in which the agents offering and accepting corruption operate, as well as explaining the importance of the agents for the survival of their environment. The rent-seeking theory, on the other hand, finds it difficult to establishsocially effective legislation and ways to determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly. Both problems, however, are vital for solving the problem of corruption. Lacking the knowledge of the agent's environment (system) and their significance for the survival of the system, the theory cannot define incentives that would discourage the agent from acting in a corrupted way. If the rent-seeking theory does not determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
O - Miscellaneous
CEP classification
AH - Economics
OECD FORD branch
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Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)
Others
Publication year
2012
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů