Corruption as a Problem of Parallel Redistribution System

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62156489%3A43110%2F12%3A00181107" target="_blank" >RIV/62156489:43110/12:00181107 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Corruption as a Problem of Parallel Redistribution System
Original language description
We present a model of parallel redistribution system to explain the problem of corruption. Within this model we synthesize both agency theory and rent-seeking. More precisely, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems accounting for the environment in which the agents offering and accepting corruption operate as well as explaining the importance of the agents for the survival of their environment. The rent-seeking theory, on the other hand, finds it difficult to establish socially effectivelegislation and ways to determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly. Both problems, however, are central to solving the problem of corruption. Lacking the knowledge of the agent's environment (system) and their significance for the survival of the system, the theory cannot define incentives that would discourage the agent from corrupt behavior. If the rent-seeking theory does not determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly, it can
Czech name
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Czech description
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Publication year
2012
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Article name in the collection
Modern and Current Trends in the Public Sector Research Proceedings of the 16th International Conference
ISBN
978-80-210-5822-4
ISSN
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e-ISSN
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Number of pages
9
Pages from-to
234-242
Publisher name
Masarykova univerzita
Place of publication
Brno
Event location
Brno
Event date
Jan 19, 2012
Type of event by nationality
WRD - Celosvětová akce
UT code for WoS article
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