Distributed Participation to Threshold Signature Analyzed via Game Theory

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216305%3A26220%2F26%3A0199881" target="_blank" >RIV/00216305:26220/26:0199881 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11268559" target="_blank" >https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11268559</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICUMT67815.2025.11268559" target="_blank" >10.1109/ICUMT67815.2025.11268559</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Distributed Participation to Threshold Signature Analyzed via Game Theory
Original language description
We investigate the performance of a distributed threshold signature scheme, where at least t out of n signers must participate to authenticate a message. We model this scheme as a participation game, where individual signers choose whether to submit their contribution to the (t,n) signature with a certain probability and incur a cost in doing so. We discuss the resulting Nash equilibria of the game and specifically investigate the symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, which corresponds to a stable operating point of distributed decisions made individually by the agents. Finally, we show how tweaking the information revealed to the signers may improve the efficiency of this resulting equilibrium. This study highlights a fundamental trade-off between system-wide efficiency and individual resource consumption. Our proposed mechanism thus provides a practical method for steering a decentralized system towards a more globally efficient outcome without resorting to an impractical and unfair centralized control structure.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Project
<a href="/en/project/VJ03030014" target="_blank" >VJ03030014: Development of International Collaboration in Cryptography and Cybersecurity Research</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Publication year
2025
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Article name in the collection
2025 17th International Congress on Ultra Modern Telecommunications and Control Systems and Workshops (ICUMT)
ISBN
979-8-3315-7675-2
ISSN
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e-ISSN
2157-023X
Number of pages
6
Pages from-to
311-316
Publisher name
—
Place of publication
—
Event location
Florencie, Itálie
Event date
Nov 3, 2025
Type of event by nationality
WRD - Celosvětová akce
UT code for WoS article
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