Nice "Prisoners": Experimental Evidence of Cooperation in Single-Trial and Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216305%3A26510%2F12%3APU97568" target="_blank" >RIV/00216305:26510/12:PU97568 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Nice "Prisoners": Experimental Evidence of Cooperation in Single-Trial and Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Original language description
The task of the experimental study reported here is to compare the amount of cooperation in the single-trial Prisoner's Dilemma game and in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. We confirmed that subjects (N=45) in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games weremore cooperative than subjects in single-trial games. We also found that there is less cooperation on the last move of an iterated game than there is in single-trial games. Theoretically speaking, defection is strictly dominant in single-trial games, aswell as in games with known finite end. Empirically these predictions are usually not met, and were not met in our study. We offer reasons why this might be so ? specifically, we discuss heuristic decision making rules that might account for cooperationin single-trial games.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AE - Management, administration and clerical work
OECD FORD branch
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Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach
Others
Publication year
2012
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Econ... Vysoká škola báňská -Technická univerzita Ostrava AH AE
ISSN
1803-3865
e-ISSN
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Volume of the periodical
21
Issue of the periodical within the volume
1
Country of publishing house
CZ - CZECH REPUBLIC
Number of pages
10
Pages from-to
203-212
UT code for WoS article
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EID of the result in the Scopus database
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