Self-regulation and governmental oversight: a theoretical and experimental study

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F44555601%3A13510%2F21%3A43896064" target="_blank" >RIV/44555601:13510/21:43896064 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11149-020-09421-0" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11149-020-09421-0</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11149-020-09421-0" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11149-020-09421-0</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Self-regulation and governmental oversight: a theoretical and experimental study
Original language description
A self-regulatory organization (SRO) is a non-governmental organization owned and operated by its members, with the power to create and enforce industry regulations and standards for its members. A key question is whether oversight by an SRO can replace governmental oversight, or whether supplementary governmental oversight is necessary. Using a formal model for the financial sector, and solving simultaneous games, I show that a lack of commitment by the SRO may necessitate governmental oversight of both SRO members and the SRO itself. The core of the model is supported by economics experiments.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50204 - Business and management

Project
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Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2021
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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