Self-regulating organizations under the shadow of governmental oversight: an experimental investigation
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F13%3A00394885" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/13:00394885 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2270426" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2270426</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Self-regulating organizations under the shadow of governmental oversight: an experimental investigation
Original language description
Self-regulatory organizations (SROs) can be found in education, healthcare, and other not-for-profit sectors as well as the accounting, financial, and legal professions. DeMarzo et al. (2005) show theoretically that SROs can create monopoly market powerfor their affiliated agents, but that governmental oversight, even if less efficient than oversight by the SRO, can largely offset the market power. We provide an experimental test of this conjecture. For carefully rationalized parameterizations and implementation details, we find that the predictions of DeMarzo et al. (2005) are borne out.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
O - Miscellaneous
CEP classification
AH - Economics
OECD FORD branch
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Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GAP402%2F11%2F0364" target="_blank" >GAP402/11/0364: Regulation in energy and other markets: Theoretical and Experimental Investigations</a><br>
Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Others
Publication year
2013
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů