Proving a negative: Why deterrence does not work in the Baltics

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F48546054%3A_____%2F19%3AN0000031" target="_blank" >RIV/48546054:_____/19:N0000031 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/VT3CTQEMJ3UEURSPY66G/full?target=10.1080/09662839.2019.1637855" target="_blank" >https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/VT3CTQEMJ3UEURSPY66G/full?target=10.1080/09662839.2019.1637855</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2019.1637855" target="_blank" >10.1080/09662839.2019.1637855</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Proving a negative: Why deterrence does not work in the Baltics

Original language description

The increased Russian foreign policy assertiveness and the related security concerns associated with the Eastern Flank of NATO caused a revival of interest in European deterrence after more than two decades of neglect. Yet the absence of a military invasion into the Baltics does not necessarily imply a successful deterrent threat. Quite the contrary: a detailed analysis using Boolean logic suggests that deterrence does not really work in the Baltics, neither at the conventional, nor at the sub-conventional level. A lack of capabilities undermines the credibility of NATO's conventional deterrence posture despite its clear effort to communicate the threat to the other side. The only reason why the lack of capabilities on the Eastern Flank has no negative consequences for the Alliance is because Russia has (currently) no need to advance its state interests by resorting to military force. At the same time, deterrence fails repeatedly at the sub-conventional level and it will probably continue to fail in the future. Incidents like the relocation of the Bronze Soldier Memorial in 2007, the kidnapping of a security officer in 2014 or the violations of airspace in 2018 can escalate to a full-blown crisis. Limiting the number of such incidents should be the main goal of the cumulative deterrence of hybrid threats.

Czech name

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Czech description

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Type

J_imp - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

CEP classification

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OECD FORD branch

50601 - Political science

Project

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Continuities

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year

2019

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

European Security

ISSN

09662839

e-ISSN

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Volume of the periodical

28

Issue of the periodical within the volume

4

Country of publishing house

GB - UNITED KINGDOM

Number of pages

17

Pages from-to

431-448

UT code for WoS article

000496142900003

EID of the result in the Scopus database

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