Searle on the Unity of the World
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F60076658%3A12260%2F07%3A43883112" target="_blank" >RIV/60076658:12260/07:43883112 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Searle on the Unity of the World
Original language description
According to mentalism some existing things are endowed with (subjectively) conscious minds. According to physicalism all existing things consist entirely of physical particles in fields of force. Searle holds that mentalism and physicalism are compatible and true-"the world is one". The aim of this paper is to show that Searle fails to make the compatibility between mentalism and physicalism intelligible. The paper has three parts: first, I criticize drawing an analogy between solidity and consciousness as macro-features of systems with micro-features. Second, I argue that Searle's defence of the ontological irreducibility of consciousness is terminologically confused and that his argument for the trivial nature of that irreducibility is unsuccessful.Third, I defend Nagel's argument for the causal irreducibility of conscious minds by answering some of Searle's objections to it.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AA - Philosophy and religion
OECD FORD branch
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Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
V - Vyzkumna aktivita podporovana z jinych verejnych zdroju
Others
Publication year
2007
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Axiomathes
ISSN
1122-1151
e-ISSN
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Volume of the periodical
17
Issue of the periodical within the volume
1
Country of publishing house
US - UNITED STATES
Number of pages
11
Pages from-to
41-51
UT code for WoS article
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EID of the result in the Scopus database
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