Searle on Emergence

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F12%3A00383967" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/12:00383967 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

—

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

—

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Searle on Emergence

Original language description

Searle's conception of ontological emergence is a basis for his explanation of mind and consciousness in the physical world. In this article, I try to show that a closer examination uncovers some possible ambiguities in Searle?s conception of emergence.First, I try to show that Searle?s distinction between emergent1 and emergent2 leads to a distinction between a strong and a weak interpretation of a causal consequence of interactions among constitutive entities and that from this point of view the existence of emergent2 is improbable only in the strong sense. Second, I attempt to clarify Searle?s distinction between explanation and deduction of consciousness in his claim for the non-deducibility of consciousness. At the end I try to show in what senseis Searle?s concept of emergence loaded with a form of mechanicism, one which is being abandoned in more recent ontological conceptions.

Czech name

—

Czech description

—

Type

J_x - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)

CEP classification

AA - Philosophy and religion

OECD FORD branch

—

Project

—

Continuities

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year

2012

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

Organon F

ISSN

1335-0668

e-ISSN

—

Volume of the periodical

19

Issue of the periodical within the volume

Supp.2

Country of publishing house

SK - SLOVAKIA

Number of pages

9

Pages from-to

40-48

UT code for WoS article

—

EID of the result in the Scopus database

—