Two-strategy games with time constraints on regular graphs

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F60076658%3A12310%2F20%3A43901295" target="_blank" >RIV/60076658:12310/20:43901295 - isvavai.cz</a>

Alternative codes found

RIV/60077344:_____/20:00531820

Result on the web

<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519320302812?via%3Dihub" target="_blank" >https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519320302812?via%3Dihub</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110426" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110426</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Two-strategy games with time constraints on regular graphs

Original language description

Evolutionary game theory is a powerful method for modelling animal conflicts. The original evolutionary game models were used to explain specific biological features of interest, such as the existence of ritualised contests, and were necessarily simple models that ignored many properties of real populations, including the duration of events and spatial and related structural effects. Both of these areas have subsequently received much attention. Spatial and structural effects have been considered in evolutionary graph theory, and a significant body of literature has been built up to deal with situations where the population is not homogeneous. More recently a theory of time constraints has been developed to take account of the fact that different events can take different times, and that interaction times can explicitly depend upon selected strategies, which can, in turn, influence the distribution of different opponent types within the population. Here, for the first time, we build a model of time constraint games which explicitly considers a spatial population, by considering a population evolving on an underlying graph, using two graph dynamics, birth-death and death-birth. We consider one short time scale along which frequencies of pairs and singles change as individuals interact with their neighbours, and another, evolutionary time scale, along which frequencies of strategies change in the population. We show that for graphs with large degree, both dynamics reproduce recent results from well-mixed time constraint models, including two ESSs being common in Hawk-Dove and Prisoner&apos;s Dilemma games, but for low degree there can be marked differences. For birth-death processes the effect of the graph degree is small, whereas for death-birth dynamics there is a large effect. The general prediction for both Hawk-Dove and Prisoner&apos;s dilemma games is that as the graph degree decreases, i.e., as the number of neighbours decreases, mixed ESS do appear. In particular, for the Prisoner&apos;s dilemma game this means that cooperation is easier to establish in situations where individuals have low number of neighbours. We thus see that solutions depend non-trivially on the combination of graph degree, dynamics and game. (C) 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Czech name

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Czech description

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Type

J_imp - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

CEP classification

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OECD FORD branch

10602 - Biology (theoretical, mathematical, thermal, cryobiology, biological rhythm), Evolutionary biology

Project

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Continuities

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year

2020

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

Journal of Theoretical Biology

ISSN

0022-5193

e-ISSN

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Volume of the periodical

506

Issue of the periodical within the volume

DEC 7 2020

Country of publishing house

GB - UNITED KINGDOM

Number of pages

13

Pages from-to

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UT code for WoS article

000568872900007

EID of the result in the Scopus database

2-s2.0-85089844209