Corporate social responsibility and network externalities: a game-theoretic approach

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989100%3A27510%2F24%3A10253769" target="_blank" >RIV/61989100:27510/24:10253769 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10479-023-05601-1" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10479-023-05601-1</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-023-05601-1" target="_blank" >10.1007/s10479-023-05601-1</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Corporate social responsibility and network externalities: a game-theoretic approach
Original language description
This research revisits the pioneering work by Katz and Shapiro (Am Econom Rev 75:424-440, 1985) with network (consumption) externalities in a twofold way: first, it considers Corporate Socially Responsible (CSR), instead of profit-maximising, firms; second, it uses a game-theoretic approach and analyses the commitment decision game in which firms face the binary choice to credibly commit (C) or not to commit (NC) themselves to an announced output level in the first decision-making stage. Competition at the market stage occurs & agrave; la Cournot. Results show a rich spectrum of sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcomes, ranging from the prisoner's dilemma (self-interest and mutual benefit of output commitment conflict) to the anti-prisoner's dilemma or deadlock (self-interest and mutual benefit of output commitment do not conflict), passing from the coordination to the anti-coordination game. These outcomes depend on the intensity of the social concern in the firm's objective and the network size. The article also pinpoints the welfare outcomes corresponding to the SPNE and extends the analysis to a Stackelberg rivalry setting.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Project
<a href="/en/project/GA23-06282S" target="_blank" >GA23-06282S: Evolutionary economic dynamics with finite populations: Modeling and applications</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Publication year
2024
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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