The abatement game in a dynamic oligopoly: social welfare versus profits
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989100%3A27510%2F24%3A10253772" target="_blank" >RIV/61989100:27510/24:10253772 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10479-023-05674-y" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10479-023-05674-y</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-023-05674-y" target="_blank" >10.1007/s10479-023-05674-y</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
The abatement game in a dynamic oligopoly: social welfare versus profits
Original language description
This article considers an N-firm oligopoly with abating and non-abating firms and analyses a dynamic setting in which the environmental regulator sets the tax rate to incentivise firms to undertake emission-reduction actions according to different hypotheses (fixed rule and optimal rule). The behaviour of the public authority sharply affects the firm's (individual) incentive to move towards the abatement activity over time. This changes the number of (non)abating firms on the market and the corresponding social welfare outcomes. The article eventually shows that the environmental policy may cause oscillations resulting in a coexistence of the two types of firms in the long term and pinpoints the welfare outcomes emerging in the model. (C) 2023, The Author(s).
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GA23-06282S" target="_blank" >GA23-06282S: Evolutionary economic dynamics with finite populations: Modeling and applications</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2024
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Annals of Operations Research
ISSN
0254-5330
e-ISSN
1572-9338
Volume of the periodical
337
Issue of the periodical within the volume
3
Country of publishing house
NL - THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS
Number of pages
29
Pages from-to
1037-1065
UT code for WoS article
001205212100005
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85176762316