Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Virginia vs. Chicago Public Choice Theories

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62156489%3A43110%2F11%3A00179536" target="_blank" >RIV/62156489:43110/11:00179536 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Virginia vs. Chicago Public Choice Theories
Original language description
Can corruption improve economic efficiency? Classical political economists argue that corruption undermines the rule of law (Smith 2001, chap 5). The modern Public Choice proponents argue that corruption might influence the efficiency of the rule of law.While Chicago Public Choice scholars model how corruption improves efficiency of the rule of law and thus the overall economic efficiency, the Virginia Public Choice models explain how corruption reduces efficiency of the rule of law and thus the overall economic efficiency. In this short paper, we present a brief survey distinguishing among arguments of the Chicago Public Choice and Virginia Public Choice schools on how corruption influences economic efficiency. We argue that the Virginia Public Choice explanation is more realistic because it includes the influence of bureaucratic corruption.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Publication year
2011
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Article name in the collection
Human Capital and Investment in Education: The Collection of The XIV. International Scientific Conference
ISBN
978-80-7408-057-9
ISSN
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e-ISSN
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Number of pages
14
Pages from-to
99-112
Publisher name
University of Finance and Administration
Place of publication
Prague
Event location
Prague
Event date
Sep 16, 2011
Type of event by nationality
WRD - Celosvětová akce
UT code for WoS article
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