Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Virginia vs. Chicago Public Choice Theories

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62156489%3A43110%2F12%3A00188805" target="_blank" >RIV/62156489:43110/12:00188805 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Virginia vs. Chicago Public Choice Theories

Original language description

Can corruption improve economic efficiency? Classical political economists argue that corruption undermines the rule of law (Smith 2001, chap 5). The modern Public Choice proponents argue that corruption and lobbying might influence the efficiency of therule of law. While Chicago Public Choice scholars model how legal lobbying, which is corruption in Virginia Public Choice perspective, improves efficiency of the rule of law and thus the overall economic efficiency, the Virginia Public Choice models explain how corruption reduces efficiency of the rule of law and thus the overall economic efficiency. In this short paper, we present a brief survey distinguishing between arguments of the Chicago Public Choice and Virginia Public Choice schools on how corruption influences economic efficiency. We argue that the Virginia Public Choice explanation is more realistic because it includes the influence of bureaucratic rent-seeking.

Czech name

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Czech description

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Type

O - Miscellaneous

CEP classification

AH - Economics

OECD FORD branch

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Project

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Continuities

Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)

Publication year

2012

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů