Inferentialism and Normativity of Meaning

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F12%3A43866483" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/12:43866483 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9271-8" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9271-8</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9271-8" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11406-010-9271-8</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Inferentialism and Normativity of Meaning
Original language description
There may be various reasons for claiming that meaning is normative, and additionally, very different senses attached to the claim. However, all such claims have faced fierce resistance from those philosophers who insist that meaning is not normative inany nontrivial sense of the word. In this paper I sketch one particular approach to meaning claiming its normativity and defend it against the antinormativist critique: namely the approach of Brandomian inferentialism. However, my defense is not restricted to inferentialism in any narrow sense for it encompasses a much broader spectrum of approaches to meaning, connected with the Wittgensteinian and especially Sellarsian view of language as an essentially rule-governed enterprise; and indeed I refrain from claiming that the version of inferentialism I present here is in every detail the version developed by Brandom.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AA - Philosophy and religion
OECD FORD branch
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Publication year
2012
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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