Practical Cognition, Motor Intentionality, and the Idea of the Good: Considerations of Denotational and Connotational Meaning
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F22%3A50019546" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/22:50019546 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003303619-11" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003303619-11</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003303619-11" target="_blank" >10.4324/9781003303619-11</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Practical Cognition, Motor Intentionality, and the Idea of the Good: Considerations of Denotational and Connotational Meaning
Original language description
This essay uses an examination of Sellars's account of practical rationality – and, in particular, of the relationship between deontic judgment and shared intentionality – as a basis for framing a view of linguistic meaning (and by analogy human cognition) that includes distinct semantic mechanisms accounting for the representational intentionality of description, the motor intentionality of agency, and the intralinguistic intentionality of reflexive cognition. The semantic resources of model theory are used to account for the two world-regarding varieties of meaning, and those of proof theory are used to account for reflexive intralinguistic meaning. Model theory and proof theory thereby afford a framework for reconstructing the pre-Carnapian notions of denotation and connotation as two compatible dimensions of linguistic meaning, permuted through an understanding of cognition as involving representational, agentive, and reflexive moments – analogous to the three moments of the reflex arc of neural activity, and the transcendental ideas of the Beautiful, the Good, and the True. In the process of articulating the view, and based on recent work by Stefanie Dach, Stovall gives a proof-theoretic characterization of Wilfrid Sellars's theory of moral judgments. The result is a view on which our rational responsiveness to the idea of the Good can be accounted for without supposing that we represent the Good in the way we represent the environment and our places in it.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
C - Chapter in a specialist book
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GX20-05180X" target="_blank" >GX20-05180X: Inferentialism naturalized: norms, meanings and reasons in the natural world</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2022
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Book/collection name
Ethics, Practical Reasoning, Agency: Wilfrid Sellars's Practical Philosophy
ISBN
978-1-00-330361-9
Number of pages of the result
24
Pages from-to
165-188
Number of pages of the book
262
Publisher name
Routledge
Place of publication
New York
UT code for WoS chapter
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