Social Ontology, Evolution, and the Foundations of Practice Theory
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F24%3A50022208" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/24:50022208 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68656-6_11" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68656-6_11</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68656-6_11" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-031-68656-6_11</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Social Ontology, Evolution, and the Foundations of Practice Theory
Original language description
By treating linguistic representation as arising from social interaction, practice-theoretic approaches to language presuppose a capacity for joint action, and this presupposition exposes it to a potential circularity. The presupposition seems to arise when communities are said to endorse or accept rules. Practice theory takes mental representation, including the intentionality of thought and action, to be a consequence or product of linguistic representation, and the intentionality of action is a species of mental representation. Several decades of intensive work on joint action, however, has yielded a range of theories, all of which require sophisticated mental representations, such as propositional attitudes, mind-reading, mutual knowledge, and so on. From the perspective of contemporary social ontology, there is simply no way that practices sufficiently sophisticated to support practice-theoretic accounts of representation could arise without the prior existence of human-like representational capacities. Social accounts of representation in the vein of Wittgenstein, Sellars, or Brandom, one might argue, are simply non-starters. Call this the “social ontology objection” to practice-theoretic accounts of language. The object of this essay is to rebut the social ontology objection by providing a minimalist account of joint action and thereby putting practice theory on a firm social-ontological foundation.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
C - Chapter in a specialist book
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GX20-05180X" target="_blank" >GX20-05180X: Inferentialism naturalized: norms, meanings and reasons in the natural world</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2024
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Book/collection name
Wittgenstein on Practice: Back to the Rough Ground
ISBN
978-3-031-68655-9
Number of pages of the result
29
Pages from-to
239-267
Number of pages of the book
326
Publisher name
Palgrave Macmilan
Place of publication
Cham
UT code for WoS chapter
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