Neural Correlates of Consciousness Meet the Theory of Identity

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F18%3A00491716" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/18:00491716 - isvavai.cz</a>

Alternative codes found

RIV/49777513:23330/18:43951577

Result on the web

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01269" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01269</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01269" target="_blank" >10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01269</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Neural Correlates of Consciousness Meet the Theory of Identity

Original language description

One of the greatest challenges of consciousness research is to understand the relationship between consciousness and its implementing substrate. Current research into the neural correlates of consciousness regards the biological brain as being this substrate, but largely fails to clarify the nature of the brain-consciousness connection. A popular approach within this research is to construe brain-consciousness correlations in causal terms: the neural correlates of consciousness are the causes of states of consciousness. After introducing the notion of the neural correlate of consciousness, we argue (see Against Causal Accounts of NCCs) that this causal strategy is misguided. It implicitly involves an undesirable dualism of matter and mind and should thus be avoided. A non-causal account of the brain-mind correlations is to be preferred. We favor the theory of the identity of mind and brain, according to which states of phenomenal consciousness are identical with their neural correlates. Research into the neural correlates of consciousness and the theory of identity (in the philosophy of mind) are two major research paradigms that hitherto have had very little mutual contact. We aim to demonstrate that they can enrich each other. This is the task of the third part of the paper in which we show that the identity theory must work with a suitably defined concept of type. Surprisingly, neither philosophers nor neuroscientists have taken much care in defining this central concept, more often than not, the term is used only implicitly and vaguely. We attempt to open a debate on this subject and remedy this unhappy state of affairs, proposing a tentative hierarchical classification of phenomenal and neurophysiological types, spanning multiple levels of varying degrees of generality. The fourth part of the paper compares the theory of identity with other prominent conceptions of the mind-body connection. We conclude by stressing that scientists working on consciousness should engage more with metaphysical issues concerning the relation of brain processes and states of consciousness. Without this, the ultimate goals of consciousness research can hardly be fulfilled.

Czech name

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Czech description

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Type

J_imp - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

CEP classification

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OECD FORD branch

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Project

—

Continuities

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year

2018

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

Frontiers in Psychology

ISSN

1664-1078

e-ISSN

—

Volume of the periodical

9

Issue of the periodical within the volume

24 July

Country of publishing house

CH - SWITZERLAND

Number of pages

13

Pages from-to

1-13

UT code for WoS article

000439619100001

EID of the result in the Scopus database

2-s2.0-85050484345