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Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players

The result's identifiers

  • Result code in IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F16%3A00461426" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/16:00461426 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Alternative codes found

    RIV/00216208:11640/16:00472319

  • Result on the web

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.013" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.013</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.013" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.013</a>

Alternative languages

  • Result language

    angličtina

  • Original language name

    Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players

  • Original language description

    The paper proves, by construction, the existence of Markovian equilibria in a dynamic spatial legislative bargaining model. Three players bargain over one-dimensional policies in an infinite horizon. In each period, a sequential protocol of proposal-making and voting, with random proposer recognitions and a simple majority, produces a policy that becomes the next period's status-quo. An equilibrium exists for any profile of proposer recognition probabilities, any profile of players' ideal policies, and any discount factor. In equilibrium, policies converge to the median's ideal policy, players moderate and propose policies close to the median's ideal in an attempt to constraint future proposers, but the tendency to moderate is a strategic substitute as the opponent of a moderating player does not moderate.

  • Czech name

  • Czech description

Classification

  • Type

    J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)

  • CEP classification

    AH - Economics

  • OECD FORD branch

Result continuities

  • Project

  • Continuities

    I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Others

  • Publication year

    2016

  • Confidentiality

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Data specific for result type

  • Name of the periodical

    Games and Economic Behavior

  • ISSN

    0899-8256

  • e-ISSN

  • Volume of the periodical

    98

  • Issue of the periodical within the volume

    July

  • Country of publishing house

    US - UNITED STATES

  • Number of pages

    8

  • Pages from-to

    235-242

  • UT code for WoS article

    000381955100014

  • EID of the result in the Scopus database

    2-s2.0-84978230436