Simple Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F20%3A00540205" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/20:00540205 - isvavai.cz</a>

Alternative codes found

RIV/00216208:11640/20:00525430

Result on the web

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.101816" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.101816</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.101816" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.101816</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Simple Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining

Original language description

The paper proves, by construction, the existence of Markovian equilibria in a dynamic spatial legislative bargaining model. Players bargain over policies in an infinite horizon. In each period, a sequential protocol of proposal-making and voting, with random proposer recognitions and a simple majority, produces a policy that becomes the next period's status-quo, the status-quo is endogenous. The construction relies on simple strategies determined by strategic bliss points computed by the algorithm we provide. A strategic bliss point, the dynamic utility ideal, is a moderate policy relative to a bliss point, the static utility ideal. Moderation is strategic and germane to the dynamic environment, players moderate in order to constrain the future proposals of opponents. Moderation is a strategic substitute, when a player's opponents do moderate, she does not, and when they do not moderate, she does. We provide conditions under which the simple strategies induced by the strategic bliss points computed by the algorithm deliver a Stationary Markov Perfect equilibrium, and we prove its existence in generic games with impatient players and in symmetric games. Because the algorithm constructs all equilibria in simple strategies, we provide their general characterization, and we show their generic uniqueness.

Czech name

—

Czech description

—

Type

J_imp - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

CEP classification

—

OECD FORD branch

50201 - Economic Theory

Project

—

Continuities

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year

2020

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

European Journal of Political Economy

ISSN

0176-2680

e-ISSN

—

Volume of the periodical

63

Issue of the periodical within the volume

June

Country of publishing house

NL - THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

Number of pages

20

Pages from-to

101816

UT code for WoS article

000538156800001

EID of the result in the Scopus database

2-s2.0-85081245355