Inefficient rushes in auctions
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F18%3A00490251" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/18:00490251 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE2513" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE2513</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE2513" target="_blank" >10.3982/TE2513</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Inefficient rushes in auctions
Original language description
We analyze a setting common in privatizations, public tenders, and takeovers in which the ex post efficient allocation, i.e., the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best because it is prone to rushes, i.e., all active bidders quitting simultaneously, that undermine its efficiency. Our second main result is that the second best can be implemented with a two‐round auction used in real‐life privatizations. We also show how this resultngeneralizes using a survival auction with a novel tie‐breaking rule.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50201 - Economic Theory
Result continuities
Project
—
Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Others
Publication year
2018
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Theoretical Economics
ISSN
1933-6837
e-ISSN
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Volume of the periodical
13
Issue of the periodical within the volume
1
Country of publishing house
US - UNITED STATES
Number of pages
34
Pages from-to
273-306
UT code for WoS article
000423829200013
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85041597027