Do higher wages produce career politicians? Evidence from two discontinuity designs

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F18%3A00497264" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/18:00497264 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp630.pdf" target="_blank" >https://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp630.pdf</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Do higher wages produce career politicians? Evidence from two discontinuity designs
Original language description
Wages paid to politicians affect both the selection of candidates into electoral races and the on-the-job performance incentives of incumbents. We differentiate between selection and incentive effects using two regression discontinuity designs based on: 1) population thresholds shifting politicians' wages and 2) electoral seat thresholds splitting candidates into those who narrowly won or lost. We find that higher wages do not increase the electoral incumbency advantage, suggesting that the incentive effect of higher wages does not impact re-election rates. We further show that higher wages motivate narrowly elected incumbents to run again much less often than past narrowly non-elected candidates.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Project
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Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2018
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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