Political salaries, electoral selection and the incumbency advantage: evidence from a wage reform
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F21%3A00549385" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/21:00549385 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2021.04.004" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2021.04.004</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2021.04.004" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.jce.2021.04.004</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Political salaries, electoral selection and the incumbency advantage: evidence from a wage reform
Original language description
Incumbents tend to gain solid electoral advantage in many voting systems. In this study, we examine the relationship between salaries prescribed to politicians and the incumbency advantage by exploiting a political wage reform and data from close elections in a proportional semi-open list system in the Czech Republic. We show that higher salaries reduce the average incumbency advantage, as they increase the probability to run again for previously non-elected candidates much more than for incumbents. Still, we find that higher wages improve candidate selection, especially by encouraging repeated candidacy from university-educated incumbents. Higher wages also improve relative positions of re-running incumbents on candidate lists compared to previously non-elected re-running candidates. Our results overall suggest that incumbency per se changes the relationship between political wages and candidate selection.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/EF16_013%2F0001740" target="_blank" >EF16_013/0001740: SHARE-CZ+ National Research on Aging</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2021
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Journal of Comparative Economics
ISSN
0147-5967
e-ISSN
1095-7227
Volume of the periodical
49
Issue of the periodical within the volume
4
Country of publishing house
US - UNITED STATES
Number of pages
28
Pages from-to
1020-1047
UT code for WoS article
000756859700009
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85106562617