Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F15%3A00235173" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/15:00235173 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

<a href="http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_15" target="_blank" >http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_15</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_15" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_15</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games

Original language description

The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader?s choice. Westudy Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximate algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.

Czech name

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Czech description

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Type

D - Article in proceedings

CEP classification

IN - Informatics

OECD FORD branch

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Project

<a href="/en/project/GA15-23235S" target="_blank" >GA15-23235S: Abstractions and Extensive-Form Games with Imperfect Recall</a><br>

Continuities

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Publication year

2015

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Article name in the collection

Web and Internet Economics

ISBN

978-3-662-48994-9

ISSN

0302-9743

e-ISSN

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Number of pages

15

Pages from-to

201-215

Publisher name

Springer

Place of publication

Berlin

Event location

Amsterdam

Event date

Dec 9, 2015

Type of event by nationality

WRD - Celosvětová akce

UT code for WoS article

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