Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F17%3A00318710" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/17:00318710 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3133242" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3133242</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3133242" target="_blank" >10.1145/3133242</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games
Original language description
The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader's choice. We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximation algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.
Czech name
—
Czech description
—

Type
J<sub>ost</sub> - Miscellaneous article in a specialist periodical
CEP classification
—
OECD FORD branch
10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Project
<a href="/en/project/GA15-23235S" target="_blank" >GA15-23235S: Abstractions and Extensive-Form Games with Imperfect Recall</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Publication year
2017
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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