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Tackling Sequential Attacks in Security Games

The result's identifiers

  • Result code in IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F19%3A00339901" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/19:00339901 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Result on the web

    <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32430-8_20" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32430-8_20</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32430-8_20" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-030-32430-8_20</a>

Alternative languages

  • Result language

    angličtina

  • Original language name

    Tackling Sequential Attacks in Security Games

  • Original language description

    Many real-world security problems exhibit the challenge of sequential attacks (i.e., the attacker carries out multiple attacks in a sequential manner) on important targets. Security agencies have to dynamically allocate limited security resources to the targets in response to these attacks, upon receiving real-time observations regarding them. This paper focuses on tackling sequential attacks using Stackelberg security games (SSGs), a well-known class of leader-follower games, which have been applied for solving many real-world security problems. Previous work on SSGs mainly considers a myopic attacker who attacks one or multiple targets simultaneously against each defense strategy. This paper introduces a new sequential-attack game model (built upon the Stackelberg game model), which incorporates real-time observations, the behavior of sequential attacks, and strategic plans of non-myopic players. Based on the new game model, we propose practical game-theoretic algorithms for computing an equilibrium in different game settings. Our new algorithms exploit intrinsic properties of the equilibrium to derive compact representations of both game state history and strategy spaces of players (which are exponential in number in the original representations). Finally, our computational experiments quantify benefits and losses to the attacker and defender in the presence of sequential attacks.

  • Czech name

  • Czech description

Classification

  • Type

    D - Article in proceedings

  • CEP classification

  • OECD FORD branch

    10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Result continuities

  • Project

    <a href="/en/project/GJ19-24384Y" target="_blank" >GJ19-24384Y: Computing Equilibrium Strategies in Dynamic Games</a><br>

  • Continuities

    P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Others

  • Publication year

    2019

  • Confidentiality

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Data specific for result type

  • Article name in the collection

    Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

  • ISBN

    9783030324292

  • ISSN

    0302-9743

  • e-ISSN

  • Number of pages

    21

  • Pages from-to

    331-351

  • Publisher name

    Springer

  • Place of publication

    Wien

  • Event location

    Stockholm

  • Event date

    Oct 30, 2019

  • Type of event by nationality

    WRD - Celosvětová akce

  • UT code for WoS article