Tackling Sequential Attacks in Security Games
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F19%3A00339901" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/19:00339901 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32430-8_20" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32430-8_20</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32430-8_20" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-030-32430-8_20</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Tackling Sequential Attacks in Security Games
Original language description
Many real-world security problems exhibit the challenge of sequential attacks (i.e., the attacker carries out multiple attacks in a sequential manner) on important targets. Security agencies have to dynamically allocate limited security resources to the targets in response to these attacks, upon receiving real-time observations regarding them. This paper focuses on tackling sequential attacks using Stackelberg security games (SSGs), a well-known class of leader-follower games, which have been applied for solving many real-world security problems. Previous work on SSGs mainly considers a myopic attacker who attacks one or multiple targets simultaneously against each defense strategy. This paper introduces a new sequential-attack game model (built upon the Stackelberg game model), which incorporates real-time observations, the behavior of sequential attacks, and strategic plans of non-myopic players. Based on the new game model, we propose practical game-theoretic algorithms for computing an equilibrium in different game settings. Our new algorithms exploit intrinsic properties of the equilibrium to derive compact representations of both game state history and strategy spaces of players (which are exponential in number in the original representations). Finally, our computational experiments quantify benefits and losses to the attacker and defender in the presence of sequential attacks.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
D - Article in proceedings
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GJ19-24384Y" target="_blank" >GJ19-24384Y: Computing Equilibrium Strategies in Dynamic Games</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2019
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Article name in the collection
Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
ISBN
9783030324292
ISSN
0302-9743
e-ISSN
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Number of pages
21
Pages from-to
331-351
Publisher name
Springer
Place of publication
Wien
Event location
Stockholm
Event date
Oct 30, 2019
Type of event by nationality
WRD - Celosvětová akce
UT code for WoS article
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