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Subgroup fairness in two-sided markets

The result's identifiers

  • Result code in IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F23%3A00364563" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/23:00364563 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Result on the web

    <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0281443" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0281443</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0281443" target="_blank" >10.1371/journal.pone.0281443</a>

Alternative languages

  • Result language

    angličtina

  • Original language name

    Subgroup fairness in two-sided markets

  • Original language description

    It is well known that two-sided markets are unfair in a number of ways. For example, female drivers on ride-hailing platforms earn less than their male colleagues per mile driven. Similar observations have been made for other minority subgroups in other two-sided markets. Here, we suggest a novel market-clearing mechanism for two-sided markets, which promotes equalization of the pay per hour worked across multiple subgroups, as well as within each subgroup. In the process, we introduce a novel notion of subgroup fairness (which we call Inter-fairness), which can be combined with other notions of fairness within each subgroup (called Intra-fairness), and the utility for the customers (Customer-Care) in the objective of the market-clearing problem. Although the novel non-linear terms in the objective complicate market clearing by making the problem non-convex, we show that a certain nonconvex augmented Lagrangian relaxation can be approximated to any precision in time polynomial in the number of market participants using semidefinite programming, thanks to its "hidden convexity". This makes it possible to implement the market-clearing mechanism efficiently. On the example of driver-ride assignment in an Uber-like system, we demonstrate the efficacy and scalability of the approach and trade-offs between Inter- and Intrafairness.

  • Czech name

  • Czech description

Classification

  • Type

    J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

  • CEP classification

  • OECD FORD branch

    10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Result continuities

  • Project

    <a href="/en/project/EF16_019%2F0000765" target="_blank" >EF16_019/0000765: Research Center for Informatics</a><br>

  • Continuities

    P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Others

  • Publication year

    2023

  • Confidentiality

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Data specific for result type

  • Name of the periodical

    PLoS ONE

  • ISSN

    1932-6203

  • e-ISSN

    1932-6203

  • Volume of the periodical

    18

  • Issue of the periodical within the volume

    2

  • Country of publishing house

    US - UNITED STATES

  • Number of pages

    17

  • Pages from-to

  • UT code for WoS article

    000942161600045

  • EID of the result in the Scopus database

    2-s2.0-85148772765