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Multivariate Algorithmics for Eliminating Envy by Donating Goods

The result's identifiers

  • Result code in IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21240%2F22%3A00358172" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21240/22:00358172 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Result on the web

    <a href="https://doi.org/10.5555/3535850.3535866" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.5555/3535850.3535866</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.5555/3535850.3535866" target="_blank" >10.5555/3535850.3535866</a>

Alternative languages

  • Result language

    angličtina

  • Original language name

    Multivariate Algorithmics for Eliminating Envy by Donating Goods

  • Original language description

    Fairly dividing a set of indivisible resources to a set of agents is of utmost importance in some applications. However, after an allocation has been implemented the preferences of agents might change and envy might arise. We study the following problem to cope with such situations: Given an allocation of indivisible resources to agents with additive utility-based preferences, is it possible to socially donate some of the resources (which means removing these resources from the allocation instance) such that the resulting modified allocation is envy-free (up to one good). We require that the number of deleted resources and/or the caused utilitarian welfare loss of the allocation are bounded. We conduct a thorough study of the (parameterized) computational complexity of this problem considering various natural and problem-specific parameters (e.g., the number of agents, the number of deleted resources, or the maximum number of resources assigned to an agent in the initial allocation) and different preference models, including unary and 0/1-valuations. In our studies, we obtain a rich set of (parameterized) tractability and intractability results and discover several surprising contrasts, for instance, between the two closely related fairness concepts envy-freeness and envy-freeness up to one good and between the influence of the parameters maximum number and welfare of the deleted resources.

  • Czech name

  • Czech description

Classification

  • Type

    D - Article in proceedings

  • CEP classification

  • OECD FORD branch

    10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Result continuities

  • Project

    <a href="/en/project/EF16_019%2F0000765" target="_blank" >EF16_019/0000765: Research Center for Informatics</a><br>

  • Continuities

    P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Others

  • Publication year

    2022

  • Confidentiality

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Data specific for result type

  • Article name in the collection

    21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2022

  • ISBN

    978-1-4503-9213-6

  • ISSN

    1548-8403

  • e-ISSN

  • Number of pages

    9

  • Pages from-to

    127-135

  • Publisher name

    IFAAMAS

  • Place of publication

    County of Richland

  • Event location

    Aukland, Virtual

  • Event date

    May 9, 2022

  • Type of event by nationality

    WRD - Celosvětová akce

  • UT code for WoS article