All

What are you looking for?

All
Projects
Results
Organizations

Quick search

  • Projects supported by TA ČR
  • Excellent projects
  • Projects with the highest public support
  • Current projects

Smart search

  • That is how I find a specific +word
  • That is how I leave the -word out of the results
  • “That is how I can find the whole phrase”

The Complexity of Fair Division of Indivisible Items with Externalities

The result's identifiers

  • Result code in IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21240%2F24%3A00369990" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21240/24:00369990 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Result on the web

    <a href="https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28822" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28822</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28822" target="_blank" >10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28822</a>

Alternative languages

  • Result language

    angličtina

  • Original language name

    The Complexity of Fair Division of Indivisible Items with Externalities

  • Original language description

    We study the computational complexity of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items under externalities. In this recently-proposed setting, in addition to the utility the agent gets from their bundle, they also receive utility from items allocated to other agents. We focus on the extended definitions of envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and of envy-freeness up to any item (EFX), and we provide the landscape of their complexity for several different scenarios. We prove that it is NP-complete to decide whether there exists an EFX allocation, even when there are only three agents, or even when there are only six different values for the items. We complement these negative results by showing that when both the number of agents and the number of different values for items are bounded by a parameter the problem becomes fixed-parameter tractable. Furthermore, we prove that two-valued and binary-valued instances are equivalent and that EFX and EF1 allocations coincide for this class of instances. Finally, motivated from real-life scenarios, we focus on a class of structured valuation functions, which we term agent/item-correlated. We prove their equivalence to the "standard" setting without externalities. Therefore, all previous results for EF1 and EFX apply immediately for these valuations.

  • Czech name

  • Czech description

Classification

  • Type

    D - Article in proceedings

  • CEP classification

  • OECD FORD branch

    10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Result continuities

  • Project

    <a href="/en/project/EH22_008%2F0004590" target="_blank" >EH22_008/0004590: Robotics and advanced industrial production</a><br>

  • Continuities

    P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)<br>S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Others

  • Publication year

    2024

  • Confidentiality

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Data specific for result type

  • Article name in the collection

    Proceedings of the 38th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

  • ISBN

  • ISSN

    2159-5399

  • e-ISSN

    2374-3468

  • Number of pages

    9

  • Pages from-to

    9653-9661

  • Publisher name

    AAAI Press

  • Place of publication

    Menlo Park

  • Event location

    Vancouver

  • Event date

    Feb 20, 2024

  • Type of event by nationality

    WRD - Celosvětová akce

  • UT code for WoS article

    001241512400025