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Generation of Adversarial Malware and Benign Examples Using Reinforcement Learning

The result's identifiers

  • Result code in IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21240%2F22%3A00358962" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21240/22:00358962 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Result on the web

    <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-97087-1_1" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-97087-1_1</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97087-1_1" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-030-97087-1_1</a>

Alternative languages

  • Result language

    angličtina

  • Original language name

    Generation of Adversarial Malware and Benign Examples Using Reinforcement Learning

  • Original language description

    Machine learning is becoming increasingly popular among antivirus developers as a key factor in defence against malware. While machine learning is achieving state-of-the-art results in many areas, it also has drawbacks exploited by many with white-box attacks. Although the white-box scenario is possible in mal- ware detection, the detailed structure of antivirus is often unknown. Consequently, we focused on a pure black-box setup where no information apart from the predicted label is known to the attacker, not even the feature space or predicted score. We implemented our exploratory integrity attack using a reinforcement learning approach on a dataset of portable executable binaries. We tested multiple agent configurations while targeting LightGBM and MalConv classifiers. We achieved an evasion rate of 68.64% and 13.32% against LightGBM and MalConv classifiers, respectively. Besides traditional modelling of malware adversarial samples, we present a setup for creating benign files that can increase the targeted classifier’s false positive rate. This problem was considerably more challenging for our reinforcement learning agents, with an evasion rate of 3.45% and 36.62% against LightGBM and MalConv classifier, respectively. To understand how these attacks transfer from classifiers based purely on machine learning to real-world anti- malware software, we tested the same modified files against seven well-known antiviruses. We achieved an evasion rate of up to 47.09% in malware and 14.29% in benign adversarial attacks.

  • Czech name

  • Czech description

Classification

  • Type

    C - Chapter in a specialist book

  • CEP classification

  • OECD FORD branch

    10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Result continuities

  • Project

    <a href="/en/project/EF16_019%2F0000765" target="_blank" >EF16_019/0000765: Research Center for Informatics</a><br>

  • Continuities

    P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)<br>S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Others

  • Publication year

    2022

  • Confidentiality

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Data specific for result type

  • Book/collection name

    Cybersecurity for Artificial Intelligence

  • ISBN

    978-3-030-97086-4

  • Number of pages of the result

    23

  • Pages from-to

    3-25

  • Number of pages of the book

    380

  • Publisher name

    Springer, Cham

  • Place of publication

  • UT code for WoS chapter