Conceiving the Inconceivability of Conceivability

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11240%2F20%3A10421741" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11240/20:10421741 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Conceiving the Inconceivability of Conceivability
Original language description
One of the most famous arguments against physicalism is Chalmers' so-called "Conceivability Argument", which infers possibility of a physical state being without a phenomenal state from the conceivability of such a state. This thesis leads to a rejection of physicalism's main thesis of physical states causing phenomenal states. However, Chalmers' idea of conceivability makes a contradictory appeal to something which by his own definition cannot be externally represented, namely the non-existence of zombie twin's phenomenal states. Thus, in general, Chalmers' account lacks a sufficient criterion of representability of the entities and concepts his argument invokes, and the idea of consciousness crossing borders of physically investigable reality loses its foundations. This give rise to a question whether by supplying such criteria drawing from Peirce's semiotics, the conclusion of the argument could be maintained, which the paper aims at answering positively.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Type
D - Article in proceedings
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Project
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Continuities
S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach<br>I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2020
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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