On the hidden costs of monitoring corruption or effort

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F10%3A00341789" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/10:00341789 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Result language

angličtina

Original language name

On the hidden costs of monitoring corruption or effort

Original language description

In this paper, I analyze the effects of monitoring on an agent?s incentives in a two-period principal-agent model in which the agent decides on his effort and corruptibility. The agent?s type and strategy are unknown to the principal. I compare incentive-compatible wages under three different scenarios: when the principal does not monitor and only observes output; when she monitors the agent?s effort choice; and when she monitors the agent?s corruptibility.

Czech name

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Czech description

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Type

J_x - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)

CEP classification

AH - Economics

OECD FORD branch

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Project

<a href="/en/project/LC542" target="_blank" >LC542: Center of Advanced Political Economy Research</a><br>

Continuities

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)<br>Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)

Publication year

2010

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

CERGE-EI Working Paper Series

ISSN

1211-3298

e-ISSN

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Volume of the periodical

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Issue of the periodical within the volume

404

Country of publishing house

CZ - CZECH REPUBLIC

Number of pages

37

Pages from-to

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UT code for WoS article

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EID of the result in the Scopus database

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